Trump’s and Biden’s Foreign Policy: Implications for the European Union

Despite the importance of the U.S. on international politics, foreign policy is paradoxically often set aside in presidential races. This year is no exception. With the spread of COVID-19, the economic and financial uncertainty as well as the ongoing movements against systemic racism towards the black community, the U.S. now faces pressing domestic challenges that outweigh international matters. Drawing on Trump’s foreign policies during the past four years and on Vice President Biden’s program, this article explores what Europeans should expect after the 2020 election.

Foreign policy, the ugly duckling of U.S. presidential elections

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has traditionally endorsed the role of the global leader, promoting the liberal international order and championing principles of security, freedom, democracy and human rights around the world. 

However, with Donald Trump’s victory in 2016, U.S. foreign policy has taken an unprecedented course. He has disregarded historical alliances (notably with the European Union and South Korea), proved reluctant to stand against the violation of values the US normally defends, and seriously challenged multilateralism. 

Unlike his predecessors, Donald Trump has adopted a profound Eurosceptic attitude, questioning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) value, applauding Brexit, and even encouraging other countries to leave the EU bloc which has guaranteed peace and security in Europe for 70 years. For the first time, the trans-Atlantic relations were no longer seen as being of vital importance but rather as a threat to U.S. economic prosperity. Turning his back on traditional allies, he embraced a less critical stance towards some authoritarian or illiberal leaders such as Putin. 

Marking a fundamental break from Obama's foreign policy, Trump's "America First" doctrine rests on mistrust toward international organizations and a preference for isolationism, unilateralism and bilateral agreements as opposed to multilateral ones. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) only three days after President Trump took office set the tone of the rest of his mandate. Since then, he has, for example, withdrawn from the Paris Agreement (COP 21), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Iran Nuclear deal, the Human Rights Council, or, more recently, the World Health Organization (WHO).

Both Vice-President Biden and Senator Harris have been vocal about their numerous disagreements with those policies. During the vice-presidential debate, Senator Harris said that President Trump’s “unilateral approach to foreign policy coupled with isolationism” had hurt the country. In this regard, Vice-President Biden announced during the democratic primaries that he would rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and work with the U.S. allies to extend the nuclear deal’s constraints. 

Another main difference in the two candidates’ programme can be seen in their stand towards climate change. Biden made this topic a fundamental one during his campaign for the nomination with his “Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice” to achieve a 100% clean energy economy and net-zero emissions no later than 2050. He also committed to favour multilateralism in fighting climate change and rally the rest of the world to tackle these challenges, starting by rejoining the Paris Agreement. 

Finally, Vice-President Biden will depart from President Trump’s policy with Russia. He has warned several times that Vladimir Putin was “assaulting the foundations of western democracy” and has criticised President Trump’s cordial relations with the Russian president. 

However, the world should not expect a 360° shift during a potential Biden presidency. Indeed, the United States will likely not go back to being as interventionist as it used to be during the 2000s. Vice-President Biden’s plan for Afghanistan shares some similarities with President Trump’s and both agree on the need to bring the troops home.

As for China, even though Vice-President Biden has criticized the chaotic policy led by President Trump and even said that it was actually beneficial to China, he has also been vocal about the need to push back on China’s deepening authoritarianism and to hold it accountable for unfair trade practices. We can nonetheless expect Biden to be tougher on China in terms of human rights abuses.

Time for the EU to stand on its own feet

The European Union has long relied on Washington’s leadership to respond to international challenges. This came at a cost. Europeans neglected the formulation of a common foreign policy and invested too little, both strategically and financially, in their own defence and security. 

Since Trump’s election, the United States have become a less dependable partner for the European Union, not only in security but also in ideological terms. The lesson is clear, the Union - even if Biden is elected - cannot count on U.S. leadership anymore. Instead, the European Union should unite and strive to protect the fundamental values on which it was founded on by adopting a strong foreign policy outlook.

Europeans seem to have understood this lesson. In the midst of the international rules-based order fragmentation, the European Union seems ready to engage in the global battle of narrative, imposing itself as a “third way.” Notably, in an attempt to fill the leadership gap left by the U.S., the European Union acted as a staunch supporter of multilateralism when it was coming under attack during the COVID-19 crisis. Moreover, the European sanction regime against Russia, the launch of the Normandy process, the signature of both the 2016 EU-Turkey deal, and the Iran nuclear deal or the collective condemnation of the Belarus election are only few examples displaying the European willingness to assert its geopolitical role. Even if the European journey toward an integrated foreign policy is far from being achieved, the internal discussions on the EU foreign policy tools and their implementation, as well the call of Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen for the Commission to become a “geopolitical one” are other encouraging signs for the years to come. 

During the past four years, the European Union also took significant steps to strengthen their cooperation in the field of defence and security. With the adoption of the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in 2016, the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017, and the establishment of the European maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) last February, the Union achieved more in a few years than it did since its creation.

Efforts in this direction need to continue. As the world is becoming more and more uncertain with a broad range of hybrid threats, Europe cannot keep going without the ability to defend itself. Along with NATO and not instead of NATO, a credible European defence should be strengthened. Spending more efficiently with increased pooling and cross-countries programs would be beneficial, especially during a pandemic when increased spending on defence might not be very popular. A pathway towards this goal would be to keep building a strong European Defence Technological and Industrial Base with more cooperation in research and development. European security is first and foremost a European issue and it is time for Europe to assume responsibility.  

That being said, NATO arguably remains the strongest and most credible military alliance in the world. The questions raised by U.S. President Donald Trump, though phrased in a questionable way, highlighted the need for NATO to clarify its visions for the future, and for its members to reassess their commitments. One of the most positive consequences was notably the increase in their defence expenditure as a share of GDP by almost every member States. However, more discussions need to take place, especially about Article 5 and its implications. In this perspective, the road map to 2030 announced by Secretary General Stoltenberg is particularly opportune and will hopefully lead to a stronger, more efficient and adapted alliance in the next few years.