Israel and Palestine : Why the Biden victory does not matter

When it comes to Israel, Republicans and Democrats have displayed unparallel bipartisan agreement on the enduring role of ally. A Biden presidency fits squarely within the history and expectations of the US-Israeli alliance and is unlikely to depart from Trump’s legacy. 

American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been problematic as it refuses to acknowledge the incompatibility between the two roles it has sought to simultaneously play: the loyal ally to Israel and the self-proclaimed honest broker of a peace settlement. A roles-based approach points to how successive US administrations have fluctuated between the oppositive expectations of the two roles. Moreover, roles account for how internal and external actors combine material and ideational factors to shape the content and nature of the links between the US and Israel.Throughout the decades, disagreements between American and Israeli leaders have taken place only within the broad parameters of allyship and the enduring special relationship. Forged in the context of the Cold War, the overall nature of US support for its small and still embattled ally has not been reviewed by recent US administrations. On the contrary, the last three presidents have emphasized the role salience of ally over honest broker. Lacking any significant sources of role contestation and with foreign policy priorities laying elsewhere, the Biden presidency is unlikely to reassess the US commitment to Israel and the resulting inattentiveness to conflict resolution. 

               When considering the US-Israeli alliance, it is worth noting the context in which it originated: the onset of the Cold War. As the British and the French colonial powers slowly withdrew from the Middle East, the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) gained increasing prominence and Israel was seen as a valuable prize in the newly important oil-rich region. Despite little involvement in the pre-state era, the Cold War mindset (and domestic electoral considerations) informed the Truman administration’s recognition of the new state of Israel, 11 minutes after it was announced in 1948. A pivotal point was the Six-Day war in 1967, at the end of which Israel emerged victorious over Syria and Egypt – the two main regional concerns of the US at the time. By defeating them, Israel proved to be a fruitful asset. Within the Cold War logic, the role of ally was given extra impetus by the Soviet willingness to replenish the Arab military arsenal. As the narrative of a Goliath conflict spread, the war raised Israel’s public profile in the US and the activism of the Jewish community and Christian associations ensured no domestic role contestation took place during its formative years. 

Roles can be identified from primary and secondary sources, such as speeches, policy documents or parliamentary debates. Presidential statements provide more than political rhetoric and are representative of hundreds of statements made over time and reflective of how ally has prevailed over honest broker. An historical overview of how the US has understood its role in relation to Israel underscores the remarkable durability of some prevalent features.

Even during the Carter administration, which publicly endorsed the concept of a Palestinian homeland, the role of an honest broker was plagued by the president’s emphasis on allyship. The year before the Camp David accords were signed, Carter stated: ‘we have a special relationship with Israel. It’s absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number-one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right for Israel to exist... It's a special relationship’. During the Reagan administration, strategic cooperation reached new levels with the first Israeli-US agreement against Soviet influence.

According to the President, ‘no conviction I've ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel'. Under Reagan, economic and military aid provided to Israel reached $3 billion for the first time. By the Clinton years, the special relationship between Israel and the US had become a permanent fixture of US foreign policy and the provision of assistance meant that the US had a vested interest in its ally that inhibited its impartiality. Thus, when President Clinton sought to revive the honest broker role, peace in the Middle East and the ambitious Oslo Accords were constructed as the first pillar of Israeli security. 

Broadly speaking, the US role in the Middle East has been greatly informed by globalist paradigms. As the war on terror replaced Cold War considerations, George W. Bush sought to distance himself from Clinton’s over-involvement and the role of honest broker degenerated into little more than open endorsements of Israeli policy. During the July 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, the US and its allies successfully linked the conflict to the broader war on terror and uncritically endorsing Israel’s right to self-defense. While Obama recognized the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Middle East, his administration yielded little success with its concerted involvement owing to the framework of ally expectations. Here, Obama’s $38 billion military aid package once again placed the US in Israel’s corner. From 2010 to 2015, any initial honest broker expectations were eclipsed: Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) went from eight ambitious mentions to three scarce reminders of Israeli-Palestinian unresolved grievances. 

As for Trump’s only NSS, the commitment to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was understood strictly through allylenses, stating that ‘Israel is not the cause of the region’s problems’. Under Trump, David Freedman, a vocal opponent to the two-state solution, was appointed as the US ambassador and all funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine and Refugees was cancelled. In hindsight, moving the American embassy to Jerusalem was the fulfillment of an electoral promise, made in a 2016 speech. On the same occasion, Trump confirmed his commitment to the ally role: ‘I speak to you today as a lifelong supporter and true friend of Israel’. As for any honest brokering, ‘the Palestinians must come to the table knowing that the bond between the United States and Israel is absolutely, totally unbreakable’.

Which brings us to President-elect Biden, who is unwilling and unable to challenge the role of ally. Unwilling given his role expectations: ‘It’s about time we stop apologizing for our support for Israel’ since ‘It is the best $3bn investment we make’ (1986); ‘We’ve stood shoulder to shoulder, a lot of us in this [AIPAC] auditorium, defending the legitimate interest of Israel and our enduring commitment over the last 40 years’ (2013); ‘I strongly oppose Israel's settlement policy on the West Bank… but the idea that we would cut off military aid to an ally, our only true ally in the entire region, is absolutely preposterous’ (2019). And unable because there are too many policy priorities, domestically and internationally. Biden has to grapple with a public health crisis, ensure economic recovery and tackle deep-rooted racial inequalities, all while tackling Russian and Chinese adventurism, stabilizing transatlantic trade relationship or leading global efforts to address climate change. 

Thus, reviving the honest broker role is improbable, if it was ever impartial enough to be helpful. Through the decades, US role-taking has confirmed the role salience of ally over honest broker and resulted in a nearly myopic endorsement of Israeli policy when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unwilling and unable, it is doubtful that Biden will bring change to one of modern history's most enduring state-to-state relationships.